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There can be little dispute that the levels of sexual violence directed at women 
and children all over the world is both extraordinary and unacceptably high.  The 
South African government has prioritised resources1 to support services to 
combat this violence, and is in the process of revising both the substantive and 
procedural law pertaining to sexual offences in the hope of providing more 
protective mechanisms to victims of sexual assault.  Other jurisdictions2 have 
enacted similar legislation, commonly referred to as ‘rape-shield’ laws, which are 
primarily aimed at countering the use of irrelevant evidence by the defence to 
discredit the complainant in sexual assault trials.  This paper explores the 
disclosure of personal records of the complainant in sexual assault trials as one 
of the means of the defence in attempting to admit evidence to discredit the 
complainant.   
 
This paper will investigate the position of disclosure of personal records in other 
jurisdictions and will discuss the lack of specific legislation on this issue in South 
Africa. It will also explore legal options available for complainants and record 
holders to resist the disclosure of this information as well as the rationale of the 
defence and the courts in admitting this information into evidence as relevant.  
The paper will attempt to reveal the flawed reasoning of the defence and the 
courts in justifying the use of personal records of complainants by investigating 
the myths and stereotypes about women, children and sexual assault that inform 
this reasoning, and will recommend how government must intervene to combat 
this phenomenon to ensure real protection of women and children in the criminal 
justice system. 
                                                
1 President Mbeki ‘State of the Nation Address’ February 2005. 





The effects of a sexual assault on a person can be devastating.  While the 
specific reactions of individuals vary, it is common to experience feelings of fear, 
loneliness, self-blame, and hopelessness.  In addition, nightmares, being unable 
to sleep, not eating, and not wanting to leave the house, also occur as a result of 
a sexual assault.  It is therefore not surprising that victims of sexual assault seek 
out support and advice from a wide range of services and individuals to assist 
them through the difficult period following the assault.  These services may 
include rape crisis centres, social workers, psychologists and youth centres.  For 
the purposes of this paper, these groups will be referred to as counsellors, or 
record holders, and the information that is disclosed by the victim to the 
counsellor as confidential communications. 
 
In the 1970’s the first rape crisis centres were opened to provide support for 
victims, and to change the public’s perceptions about rape3.  The type of support 
that these centres offered was informed by a feminist theory of empowerment, 
which encouraged the restoration of choice as a primary antidote for rape 
trauma.  This fundamentally challenged the traditional ways of dealing with 
victims of trauma by giving victims an active role in their healing experience.  
Using this approach, the counsellor’s primary role is to support the victim in 
making her own decisions, and reminding her of her options in relation to issues 
such as the criminal justice process4.  The relationship that exists between victim 
and counsellor is based on trust and confidentiality as the subject matter of the 
communications is of a highly sensitive and intimate nature.  In order for the 
counselling process to be effective, open and honest communication is required, 
and cannot potentially be disclosed to outside parties. 
 
 
                                                
3 The first rape crisis centre in South Africa was established in Cape Town in 1976. 
4 J Bruno ‘Pitfalls for the Unwary: How Sexual Assault Counsellor-Victim Privileges May Fall 
Short of Their Intended Protections’ (2002) 5 University of Illinois Law Review 1373 at 1378. 
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Effects of Disclosure of Personal Records on Victims, Counsellors and the 
Criminal Justice System 
 
There are serious dangers associated with the disclosure and unrestricted use of 
information that is communicated by a sexual assault victim to her counsellor.  
The issues that face the victim are the infringement of privacy and confidentiality, 
threats to her process of recovery, fears of retribution from the accused, and 
facing the conflict of having to decide between counselling and reporting or 
proceeding with a criminal case against the accused5.  By allowing the victim’s 
records to be disclosed to the defence, feelings of revictimisation are 
experienced, reinforcing the experience of powerlessness and invasion felt at the 
time of the sexual assault6. 
 
The issues facing counsellors whose records are being sought by the defence 
include ethical dilemmas - namely, the conflict between legal and ethical 
obligations - the adverse effect of disclosure on the counselling relationship, the 
reduction of reporting of sexual assault to sexual assault services, and the 
adequacy of methods of record keeping7.  The effect of victims knowing that their 
confidential communications may be disclosed to the defence makes full 
recovery difficult, and in some cases, impossible.  A potential breach of privacy 
and trust by the counsellor (forced to do so by law) means that victims may 
censor themselves during the counselling process, or not attend counselling at 
all.  Alternatively, victims’ willingness to report may erode, impairing the 
administration of justice8.  Counsellors who are unwilling to disclose victims’ 
records may face the consequence of imprisonment for not complying with a 
court order. With the competing interests of justice and the protection of victims 
in mind, counsellors have been known to ‘disguise’ records by keeping cryptic 
                                                
5 A Cossins & R Pikinton ‘Balancing the Scales: The Case for the Inadmissibility of Counselling 
Records in Sexual Assault Trial’ (1996) 19(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 222 at 
224. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid at 227. 
8 Ibid at 230. 
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notes or dummy files that contain very limited information about the victim9, her 
personal history or the psychological effects of the sexual assault on the victim. 
 
Many of the above effects necessarily impinge on the proper administration of 
justice.  As will be discussed below, when canvassing the different jurisdictions 
and the effect of disclosure in those jurisdictions, the broad effects on the 
administration of justice include the reinforcement of a de facto presumption of 
guilt on complainants, the infringement of the public interest of protecting victims 
of crime, and the prevention of reporting of sexual assaults. 
 
Relevance   
 
The basic tenant of the argument in favour of admitting personal records of a 
sexual assault complainant is that the records may contain evidence that it 
relevant to the truth-finding process.  Most jurisdictions contain the rule that 
irrelevant evidence is inadmissible, with the South African version contained in s 
210 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  Some relevant evidence however 
may be deemed inadmissible as a result of a rule of evidence that excludes it10.   
 
Broadly, evidence is then either excluded or inadmissible on the basis of being 
irrelevant, or being subject to another rule of evidence such as privilege.  For the 
purposes of the paper, the concept of relevance will be discussed briefly and how 
it relates to disclosure of personal records. Some introductory statements on 
privilege will also be made.  It is submitted that the issue of disclosure of records 
must be seen in the light of the above, as it is in terms of either irrelevance or 
privilege that foreign jurisdictions have attempted to regulate disclosure. 
 
                                                
9 Ibid at 231. 
10 R v Schaube-Kuffler 1969 2 SA 40 (RA) 50B in PJ Schwikkard and S Van der Merwe Principles 
of Evidence 2ed (2002) at 45. 
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Relevance has been defined in a number of different ways11.  Evidence that is 
‘logically probative or disprobative’12 is considered to be relevant.  It is founded 
on the notion of common sense13.  Arguably, victims’ personal records could be 
considered relevant based on the hypothetical premise that they may reveal 
evidence that the accused did not commit the sexual assault.  This evidence may 
come in the form of a statement to that effect to a third party and may reveal that 
she consented, or that she has motive against the accused to lie, or that it was 
due to influence from the third party that the victim believes that she has been 
sexual assaulted (commonly referred to as ‘false memory syndrome’).  It is 
submitted that this reasoning can only be sustained by the myths and 
stereotypes surrounding sexual assault that women are prone to lying about 
sexual assault and make false claims to protect their reputations or out of malice 
against the accused14.   
 
If relevance is based on common sense, it is questionable whose common sense 
is being used.  It is also naïve to think that, in the decision making process, a 
court (judicial officer) does not decide what is relevant based upon what he or 
she believes to be common sense.  In the context of disclosure, common sense 
is informed by her or his views of women and children.  If those views include 
that women are unreliable, dishonest and morally unworthy, it would be a logical 
step to deem personal records of the complainant as relevant to determining the 
lack of credibility of the complainant.  Any relevancy decision would be 
dependent on the court’s experience, common sense and logic15.  The conscious 
or unconscious beliefs that women are inherently less credible and more 
untrustworthy will lead to decisions ruling that this evidence is admissible.  An 
                                                
11 Ibid at 46-47. 
12 DPP v Kilbourne 1973 AC 729 756 in Schwikkard et al op cit at 47. 
13 See generally M MacCrimmon ‘What is “Common” About Common Sense?: Cautionary Tales 
for Travellers Crossing Disciplinary Boundaries ’ (2001) 22 Cardozo Law Review 1433, PJ 
Schwikkard ‘Silence and Common Sense’ (2003) Acta Juridica 92, Cossins op cit at 245. 




excellent example of these beliefs is found in the Canadian case of R v Oslin16 
where Cory J of the Canadian Supreme Court stated: 
 
[I]t is the duty of the trial judge to ensure that the accused’s rights with regard to 
cross-examination, which are so essential to the defence, are protected.  The 
trial judge had before him all the medical records.  It would have been 
appropriate to permit cross-examination with regard to the [counselling notes], 
particularly to determine if it would throw any light either upon a possible motive 
of the complainant to allege that she was the victim of a sexual assault or with 
regard to her conduct which might have led the appellant to believe that she was 
consenting to sexual advances17. 
 
This judge reveals the influence of the myth that women are prone to make false 
allegations of sexual assault in his assessment of the relevance of the 
counselling notes of the complainant.  It is submitted by some writers18, and 
supported by this writer, that to admit evidence of this nature is to distort the 




Privilege will be discussed at various stages of this paper, and in detail in the 
South African section.  Broadly, privilege is a legal rule that allows for the 
exclusion of otherwise relevant, or possibly relevant, evidence.  In order to justify 
this practice, the public interest that is protected by the privilege must outweigh 
the public interest in having the evidence admitted19.  The question in relation to 
the production of personal records is whether the public interest in protecting the 
confidentiality of the counsellor-victim relationship is sufficient to outweigh the 
public’s interest in the accused’s right to adduce all available evidence20.   
                                                
16 (1994) 109 DLR (4th) 478. 
17 Ibid at 522, own emphasis added. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Schwikkard et al op cit at 115. 




As will be discussed in detail in this paper, the practice of requesting disclosure 
of confidential communications by the defence is sexual assault trials in South 
Africa is not common, and if it does occur, the prosecution generally does not 
oppose the request.  However, this practice is common in other jurisdictions, and 
has necessitated legislative intervention to regulate this access.  Regulation of 
access is achieved in essentially two ways: deeming that the evidence is 
irrelevant and therefore inadmissible, unless the accused can show how and why 
the evidence is relevant; or secondly, by creating a protection of privilege for the 
evidence, again with the limitation that the evidence may be adduced by the 
accused in certain circumstances where he can show relevance. 
 
No jurisdiction in the world has legislated for an absolute exclusion of information 





In 1991 the case of R v Stinchcombe21 an obligation was placed on Crown 
Attorneys to disclose “all information in its possession or control”22 unless it is 
privileged or irrelevant.  As stated by Sopinka J in this case “I am confident that 
disputes over disclosure will arise infrequently when it is made clear that counsel 
for the Crown is under a general duty to disclose all relevant information”23.  It is 
important to distinguish this ‘type’ of disclosure from applications for third party 
records.  The Stinchcombe disclosure rule involved actual witness statements in 
the possession of the Crown.  In most cases, records relating to information 
about the complainant (other than her statement to the police about the sexual 
offence incident) would not be in the possession or control of the Crown (or the 
                                                
21 R v Stinchcombe [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326. 
22 K Busby ‘Discriminatory Uses of Personal Records in Sexual Violence Cases’ (1997) 9 
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 148 at 154. 
23 Stinchcombe at 340-341. 
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police).  This gave rise to the situation where the defence were not content with 
the ‘fruits of applications for Crown disclosure’24, and sought records relating to 
the complainant in the hands of third parties. 
 
The history of disclosure of records in Canada is one that is long, complex and 
painful, and not without its defeats and victories.  This section will trace this 
history, detailing the findings of the Canadian Supreme Court in R v O’Connor25, 
R v Mills26, and more recent decisions, the response of the Canadian legislature, 
and comments and analysis from feminist academics and practitioners involved 
in and observing these developments.  It is important to firstly explore the context 
of disclosure of records, that is, why and how the seeking of these records by the 
defence came about. 
 
As recorded by numerous Canadian authors27 violence against women and 
children occurs at an alarming rate in Canadian society.  This violence remains a 
reflection and a reproduction of inequality in this society.  Koshan28 states that 
while women in Canada have long sought the protection of the law in response to 
sexual violence, the criminal justice system revictimises victims of this violence 
by placing little value on the place of the victim in a system that is characterized 
by discriminatory practices, attitudes and laws.  In an attempt to challenge and 
limit this discrimination, the Canadian legislature engaged in a rape law reform 
process that limited the mechanisms available to defence counsel for making the 
case a trial of the complainant’s credibility29.  It is largely the tactic of the defence 
in sexual offences trials the world over to attack the credibility of the complainant, 
which, linked with the myths surrounding sexual offences, often lead to the 
acquittal of the accused. 
                                                
24 J Koshan ‘Disclosure and Production in Sexual Violence Cases: Situating Stinchcombe’ (2002) 
40(3) Alberta Law Review 655 at 658. 
25 [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411. 
26 [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668. 
27 Busby (1997) op cit, Koshan op cit, K Kelly ‘”You must be crazy if you think you were raped”: 
Reflections on the Use of Complainants’ Personal and Therapy Records in Sexual Assault Trials” 
9 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law (1997) 178. 
28 Op cit at 657. 




In 1983 the doctrine of the recent complaint was repealed.  This doctrine, which 
is also operative in South Africa, presumes that if a victim does not complain at 
the first reasonable opportunity there is a likelihood that she had not been 
sexually assaulted.  In other words, a negative inference may be drawn by the 
court if this ‘immediate’ report is not made.  This presumption is traditionally been 
based upon the work of John Wigmore30, who believed that women and children 
have a proclivity to lie about sexual assault and that this must be guarded 
against31.  The effect of repealing this rule meant that people who had not 
reported the sexual assault ‘immediately’ could come forward more easily, 
especially adult victims of childhood sexual abuse. 
 
The second reform was the prohibition of the collaboration rule in 1983.  
Although it was repealed in 1976, the use of this caution was not prohibited until 
1983, which until then had cautioned juries that it was unwise to convict solely on 
the testimony of the complainant32. 
 
The third change involved restrictions on the defence of the use of the previous 
sexual history of the complainant33.  The purpose of this paper is not to discuss 
the issues of previous sexual history, suffice to say that the limitation of leading 
evidence of this nature and the cross-examination of the complainant on her 
history of sexual conduct severely limited a popular defence strategy which 
sought to define the complainant as not ‘rapeable’ because of that history34. 
 
It is in the above context that the issue of use of personal records will be 
examined.  As Kelly35 explains, defence strategies are not only shaped by law.  
Rape trials to a large extent are about the character or credibility of the 
                                                
30 Wigmore Evidence in Trials at Common Law (1940). 
31 Kelly op cit at 180. 
32 Ibid. 





complainant, and not necessarily about the conduct of the accused.  The defence 
would not able to make use of strategies aimed at discrediting the complainant 
based on certain beliefs about women and children (and those to whom they turn 
for assistance and support) if the ‘system’ itself did not hold those very beliefs.  
The ‘system’ is comprised of members of a society who impose and exercise 
those beliefs in the course of sexual assault investigations, prosecutions and 
judicial decision making.  For example, the strategy of constructing a woman as 
not ‘rapeable’ because she is a prostitute is only effective if the judicial officer 
holds the belief that prostitutes are always sexually available36.  Other examples 
include that reports of the sexual assault made some time after the incident are 
more likely to be fabricated, and that therapists produce false memories of child 
sexual abuse for adult complainants as women are mentally vulnerable to this 
type of influence37.  Law does indeed play an essential role in the protection of 
vulnerable groups, but the power of the social context in which it is operating 
cannot be underestimated.  Unless attitudes and belief systems about sexual 
assault change fundamentally, laws will continue to provide little protection. 
 
It is in this context (that of the limitations placed upon the defence to introduce 
myth based evidence into trials) that a new defence tactic flourished (particularly 
in Ontario and British Columbia)  - the defence seeking access to complainants’ 
personal records in sexual offence matters38.  Another influencing factor for this 
tactic was the increase in interest by the public and the judiciary in ‘false memory 
syndrome’39, which will be discussed in some detail below.  In the cases of R v 
O’Connor and A.B. v L.L.A40 the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court 
endorsed permitting the defence access to complainants’ personal records.  As 
Kelly insightfully notes, the use of personal records marks a change of defence 
strategy, continuing the widespread belief in patriarchal myths about sexual 
assault.  These records are used to discredit complainants' accounts of the 
                                                
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Busby (1997) op cit at 148. 
39 Ibid. 
40 [1996], 44 C.R.(4) 91 (S.C.C.). 
 
 12
assault by reintroducing myths and the corroboration requirement under the 
guise of introducing material relevant to the complainant’s ability to testify41. 
 
This paper will now discuss these judgments, the legislative response to these 
cases contained in Bill C-4642, and the constitutional challenge to this Bill 
decided on in R v Mills43.  It is important to discuss the Canadian developments 
in detail from a South African perspective, as there is currently no law or law 
reform proposals governing this particular phenomenon.  Given the similarity of 
the human rights framework of these two countries, an understanding of the 
Canadian process may give some insight and prediction as to how our courts, 
and in particular the Constitutional Court, may ultimately rule on this issue, and 
how Parliament may chose to intervene and pass regulating legislation. 
 
The types of records sought by the defence were not limited to counselling, 
therapy, and psychiatric records.  They also included records from abortion and 
birth control clinics, child welfare agencies, adoption agencies, residential and 
public schools, drug and alcohol abuse rehabilitation centres, doctors, 
employers, the military, psychiatric hospitals, records of previous charges laid by 
the complainant unrelated to the current charge, previous charges against the 
complainant, criminal records, personal diaries, Young Offender records, records 
from victim/witness assistance programmes, criminal injuries compensation 
boards, prison and youth detention centres, social welfare agencies, and 
immigration offices.  In most cases the accused and victim knew each other, 
therefore the accused not only knew that the record existed but also knew that it 
contained sensitive information about the complainant44.   
 
In some cases, such as O’Connor, the accused was responsible for creating the 
record.  Busby’s research has shown that although personal records could be 
                                                
41 Kelly op cit at 179. 
42 Statutes of Canada 1997 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (production of records in sexual 
offence proceedings) Assented to 25th April, 1997. 
43 Op cit. 
44 Busby (1997) op cit at 150-151. 
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sought in any criminal case, records are sought mainly in sexual offences 
cases45.  This was a phenomenon recognized by the minority in both O’Connor 
and A.B.46.  Research by Kelly47 also clearly indicated that not only were 
applications for records almost the exclusive domain of sexual assault trials, but 
that the extent of the records sought and used was startling.  Her research 
corroborates that of Busby in relation to the types of records sought, from 
medical records including information on medication prescribed to the 
complainant following the assault, to files from Child Protective Services, files of 
social workers, and personal letters of the complainant.  She observed that all 
women have some kind of record, be they medical records or records of her 
seeking assistance from a rape crisis centre or victim assistance programme 
following the assault.  Her research showed that where no records exist, the 
defence may ‘generate’ records by requesting that the complainant be assessed 
by a psychologist and/or gynaecologist selected by the defence.  A particularly 
vulnerable group were those adult victims of childhood abuse who attended 
counselling as adults.  The intention behind the obtaining of the records was to 
seek evidence that would question the ‘believability’ of the complainant generally. 
For instance evidence of ‘false memory syndrome’ whereby information about 
the assault is created by the counsellor or therapist or other investigations such 
as past criminal behaviour, a history of victim being unreliable, lying, operating 
‘outside of the system’ or not being an ‘upstanding’ member of society.  The main 
reason for the defence seeking personal records of the complainant was to 
attack her credibility, motive and character48. 
 
O’Connor and A.B. 
 
Prior to O’Connor the lower courts were inconsistent with cases where records 
were sought by the defence.  The issue finally came before the Supreme Court in 
                                                
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Kelly op cit at 183. 
48 Busby (1997) op cit at 151. 
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O’Connor where the accused had sought the records of the complainants 
including medical, counselling, school and employment records49.  At the outset, 
it is of concern that the majority did not mention or comment on the relative 
inherent power discrepancies between the accused and the complainants: the 
complainants were Aboriginal women in the employee of the accused, a white 
man50.  There were several interveners51 who made submissions to the 
Supreme Court, as well as a coalition comprised of the Aboriginal Women’s 
Council, DAWN Canada, the Canadian Association of Sexual Assault Centres, 
and LEAF52.  The argument forwarded by the coalition stated that personal 
records were irrelevant, or very rarely relevant, and that the arguments 
supporting relevancy were based on myths and stereotypes about women, 
children and sexual assault, including the ‘original myth’ that ‘women are prone to 
lie about rape and to fabricate rape charges that place innocent men at risk’53.  
The coalition went on to argue that the effect of disclosure would deter women 
from reporting sexual assaults to the police, and would have a disproportionate 
effect on particular groups who are vulnerable to sexual assault and having 
records made about them: Aboriginal women, those who are poor, disabled, and 
racialised54.  The coalition stated: 
 
[U]ntil the devaluation of women and children, their word, and their integrity are 
addressed instead of reinforced by law, this Court should hold that disclosure of 
complainants’ personal records is so likely to reinstate sexism in the 
administration of criminal law, to deter reporting, to distort the fact finding process 
and to violate victims’ integrity that affirmation of complainants’ constitutional 
rights, no less than the integrity of the justice system, requires that no personal 
records be disclosed in any sexual offence proceeding55. 
 
                                                
49 Koshan op cit at 658. 
50 Busby (1997) op cit at 152. 
51 Included the Canadian Mental Heath Association, and the Attorneys General of Ontario and 
Canada. 
52 Koshan op cit at 659. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 O’Connor ibid at para. 65. 
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The Supreme Court heard the case of A.B. at the same time as O’Connor, a 
case that involved an allegation of sexual assault of a six year old that had taken 
place some ten years prior to the matter being reported.  The accused was a 
family friend, who wanted access to the counselling records of the complainant56. 
 
A two-step procedure was developed by the Supreme Court to dispose of 
applications for third party records.  First, the defence has to satisfy the judge 
that the third party records were ‘likely relevant’ or had a ‘reasonable possibility 
of being logically probative to an issue at trial or the competence of a witness to 
testify’. If this was achieved, the records were to be produced to the judge.  The 
second part of the application procedure required the judge to review the records 
and evaluate several factors to determine whether the evidentiary value of the 
records outweighed their negative effects, in which case the records were to be 
produced to the accused.  The factors to be evaluated included the extent to 
which the accused needed the records to make a full answer and defence, the 
probative value of the records, the reasonable expectation of privacy that the 
complainant may have in relation to the records, whether the request for 
production and the actual production was premised upon discriminatory beliefs, 
and the potential prejudice that the production of the record may have on the 
dignity, privacy and security of the person of the complainant57. 
 
In both cases, none of the records that were sought by the defence formed part 
of the Crown’s case, and were not relied on by the state to prove its case.  The 
majority however commented on the situation where records may be in the 
control of the Crown by holding that Stinchcombe had placed an obligation on the 
Crown to disclose all relevant information ‘in its possession or control’58.  The 
majority held that records that were held by governmental or quasi-governmental 
agencies fell into the Crown’s ‘possession or control’, even if the Crown was not 
aware of their existence.  A duty was placed on the Crown to learn about the 
                                                
56 Busby (1997) op cit at 153. 
57 Koshan op cit at 660. 
58 Op cit at 167. 
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existence of any of these records and disclose them to the defence.  This would 
include records from counselling centres, such as some rape crisis centres, that 
receive state funding59.  Factors, such as privacy interests of the complainant, 
would not be considered, as records in the possession of the Crown were 
assumed to be relevant and to have been subject to a waiver of confidentiality. 
 
With regard to records not in the possession or control of the state, the majority 
held that ‘by way of illustration only, were of the view that there are a number of 
ways in which information contained in third party records may be relevant, for 
example, in sexual assault cases’60 and disagreed with the minority position that 
records would only be relevant to the defence in rare cases61.  The majority then 
gave examples of situations where records would meet the test of ‘likely relevant’ 
– where the records concerned the credibility of the complainant, an account of 
the alleged sexual assault, or the use of therapy or counselling which may have 
influenced the memory of the complainant62.  The effect of this ruling is that 
counselling records that may touch on the assault or any other abuse must be 
disclosed to the judge63. 
 
The minority on the other hand, disagreed with the majority, holding that 
disclosure should not be ordered based on assertions of credibility generally, 
recent complaint, prior inconsistent statements, character, sexual abuse by other 
people, or simply having seen a counsellor64.  The minority, although in 
agreement with the two-stage procedure that should be followed to determine 
disclosure, disagreed on the factors that should be considered, recognising that 
the equality rights of both the complainant and the accused must play a central 
role65. 
 
                                                
59 Busby (1997) op cit at 155. 
60 O’Connor ibid at 176. 
61 Ibid at 177. 
62 Ibid at 177. 
63 Busby (1997) ibid at 157. 




Traditionally, complainants in sexual offences trials have no locus standi as they 
are considered third parities, or witnesses for the prosecution, with no legal 
interest in the outcome of the trial.  While this paper does not allow for any further 
discussion on this issue generally, it is important to note that the case of A.B. 
established an important principle that complainants and other parties that hold 
records that have been requested by the defence to disclose records have 
standing to make submissions, be heard, and appeal the outcome of such 
applications66. 
 
Although the Canadian legislature responded to these cases by passing Bill C-46 
which addressed a number of the concerns raised by academics and 
practitioners working with sexual offences, it is opportune at this juncture to 
discuss some of these concerns as they are of relevance and importance to the 
current situation in South Africa.  It is also submitted that although Bill C-26 does 
go along way in addressing these concerns, the legislation does not effectively 
counter them all, making the comments of the authors discussed below still 
relevant, and of particular importance for South African legal reform process 
should Parliament chose to legislate on this issue, as is recommended by this 
writer. 
 
Following the decisions of O’Connor and A.B. two authors in particular wrote 
extensively on the effects of the majority judgement, Karen Busby and Katherine 
Kelly.  Karen Busby had been part of the coalition, and represented LEAF in the 
hearings before the Supreme Court.  The authors investigated and analysed the 
judgements and their effects from different perspectives, reaching the same 
conclusion, that these cases ‘are disastrous for women and children who have 
been sexually assaulted’67. 
 
                                                
66 A.B. op cit at paras 24-28. 
67 Busby (1997) op cit at 176. 
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Busby first analysed the majority’s examples of where records would be 
considered ‘likely relevant’.  According to the majority ‘if there is a reasonably 
close connection between the creation of the records and the date of the alleged 
commission of the offence’, or where ‘they may contain information concerning 
the unfolding of events underlying the criminal complaint’68, records may be 
relevant.  The rationale behind this is that there may be an inconsistency 
between what is contained in the notes of the counsellor (based on what the 
complainant has told the counsellor) and the statement made to the police, or 
testimony in court.  Busby severely criticises this rationale, reasoning that the 
fundamental purpose of counselling is for support and to deal with the trauma 
experienced by most victims of sexual assault.  Notes taken by a counsellor are 
likely to be incomplete and inaccurate (as the complainant may not give the 
details of the assault) and would not have been adopted or ratified by the 
complainant69.  The intention of the notes is not to keep an accurate account of 
the assault.  In addition, the notes may contain concerns of the complainant that 
are typical of victims of sexual assault, such as self blame, which are a result of 
the complainant’s internalisation of rape mythology or a desire to create a 
predictable world where she believes that rape can be avoided or controlled70.  
Notes may also reflect discriminatory beliefs about women and rape held by the 
record keeper, for example, that a lack of resistance amounts to consent, or that 
a disabled woman ought to be happy with whatever sexual attention they get71.  
This may result in records that do not in any way accurately reflect the situation 
of the victim, contradictions or inconsistencies that she will be cross-examined 
about at trial, which may in turn, unfairly, result in an acquittal. 
 
It is submitted that the above ruling of the majority is fundamentally flawed in a 
number of ways.  It is not the norm in a therapeutic relationship for the counsellor 
to require the victim to recount the sexual assault in any detail.  The content of 
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the communication is largely dictated by the victim, who chooses what to tell, and 
when to tell it.  It is not the purpose of the therapeutic process to necessarily 
focus on the details of the assault, but rather to develop coping or survival 
mechanisms to be able to deal with the consequences of being so intimately 
violated.  The potential result of this situation is that records kept by a counsellor, 
in relation to the details of the actual assault, may be sketchy, inaccurate and 
without any real detail.  It must also be noted that it is certainly not the intent of 
the counsellor to keep a detailed account of the incident (nor is the counsellor 
necessarily trained and skilled to do so).  It is also interesting to note that should 
the counsellor’s records corroborate the version of the victim, the state would be 
prevented from leading this evidence according to the rules of evidence72. 
 
In relation to the majority’s decision that records must be disclosed if they contain 
information that bears on the complainant’s credibility, including testimonial 
factors such as the quality of the complainant’s perception of the events of the 
assault, and their memory since73, the minority had held that the defence should 
have to show some basis that there is likely to be information that would relate to 
the complainant’s credibility on a particular issue at trial74.  The effect of the 
majority position is that complainants that have histories of mental illness, and 
have taken medication for said illness, have their credibility challenged on the 
basis that the medication could affect memory.  For those complainants with 
histories of drug abuse, or criminal records, this could be construed as having 
disrespect for the law, and having a history of discreditable conduct.  Women 
who have been systematically disadvantaged, for example those who have been 
subject to child welfare systems as children, have become child prostitutes, or 
have been institutionalised – all events which are disproportionately documented 
- may have these records used to discredit them as being people who lie and 
have a flagrant disregard for law and society75. 
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As a result of the majority’s decision, evidence of prior sexual abuse was used 
extensively by the defence to attack the credibility of the complainant.  In a 
case76 subsequent to O’Connor the defence sought this evidence to demonstrate 
that the complainant came from a dysfunctional background and had a tendency 
to lie77.  The evidence contained ‘expert’ opinion from a paediatrician who stated 
 
‘…such persons are a significant risk for establishing lifestyles based on 
disordered sexual perception, including prostitution. Such persons demonstrate a 
significant incidence of false reporting or sexual abuse and/or false identification 
of an individual as having sexually abused them’78. 
 
Evidence of such a nature could be effective in convincing the court that the 
complainant therefore lacks the ability to discern truth from fabrication or fantasy, 
and acquit the accused. 
 
With regard to the majority’s position as to when records would meet the test of 
‘likely relevant’ where therapy or counselling may have influenced the memory of 
the complainant, the judgement reflects the scepticism concerning the reliability 
of recovered memories of sexual abuse, and buys into the belief that rape 
counsellors, influenced by stereotypical feminist doctrine (that all men are 
rapists) are ideologically committed to forcing their clients into believing that they 
were abused79. 
 
Katherine Kelly’s research focussed on the use of personal records in a social 
and legal context that is still subject to gender-based myths about sexual assault.  
As noted above, Kelly is of the opinion that the social context is vital to 
understanding how and why the defence can and does, with success, request 
personal records of the complainant, and how the courts have accepted and 
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endorsed this practice, finding relevant the most private and sensitive aspects of 
victims lives in order to discredit them.  In this process of understanding, she 
refers to ‘mundane reason and patriarchal discourses’80, which will now be 
discussed. 
 
In its most simple form, the reason why records are used is because they work81.  
Records provide a known mechanism for assessing the competing accounts from 
the complainant and the accused.  This is done within a context of patriarchal 
discourses about sexual assault, gender and mental illness82.  The respondents 
in her research study (who included Crown prosecutors, police, judges and 
defence counsel) indicated that the records are investigated by both the Crown 
and the defence to establish whether the case involves a real sexual assault.  
Other issues looked for include therapeutic techniques that may have 
contaminated the account of the assault, evidence of motives to lie, and evidence 
of medical or mental problems (use of drugs or history of delusions)83.  The 
research revealed that evidence of ‘mental instability’ was viewed by most 
respondents as evidence that the complainant had no credibility.  Mental 
instability may be as a result of being an incest survivor, the use of drugs, or 
having a criminal record of being a prostitute.  Any therapeutic treatment that a 
complainant may have received for mental illness automatically resulted in her 
credibility being reduced84. 
 
Kelly also found that records were used to intimidate and embarrass 
complainants.  Use of personal information, under the guise of relevance, had 
the effect of women withdrawing charges and refusing to continue with trials85.  
Kelly sees the above manifestations as resonating with the very myths that the 
legal changes in Canada were meant to counter.  She draws on the work of 
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Smith86 who writes that in the social world events are not facts – events are 
transformed into facts through a process of categorising events.  This becomes 
complex when there are competing accounts of the same event, and a decision 
must be made as to which account must be chosen.  This is the process that a 
court must enter into to come to a finding in matters of sexual assault.  Kelly goes 
further, illustrating that one must factor in the discursive context in which the 
accounts are embedded, realising that it is the dominant discourse that ultimately 
shapes the decision of the judicial officer, which is touted as the fact finding 
(found) process87.  These dominant discourses provide informational filters, for 
example, which type of people are more likely to lie, or are mentally unstable, or 
have perception problems.  A number of factors determine the dominant 
discourse, such as the status or the gender of the person giving or assessing the 
account, for example, doctors and lawyers.  Any account which coincides with 
the dominant discourse will be more easily accepted, and those in opposition to 
the dominant discourse more easily disregarded.  This is played out in many 
sexual assault trials, where feminist experts have attempted to challenge existing 
social practices and understandings of sexual assault, only to be dismissed as 
irrelevant or bad88. 
 
Personal records are thus used to establish that the complainant is mentally ill, is 
mentally unstable, is lying, based on inconsistent information between counsellor 
notes and statements to the police, and/or to look for motivations of anger and 
revenge89. 
 
Finally, the research showed that the impact of use of personal records is 
extensive and devastating: fewer women will report the sexual assault; women 
are constructed as not being credible and thus not rapeable; fewer women will 
seek support and assistance from counselling groups for fear of their personal 
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records being made public; and the continuation of focus on women in sexual 
assault trials as opposed to the actions of the accused90. 
 
Busby’s later research included a close analysis of a number of cases heard 
subsequent to O’Connor, finding a pattern in the defence applications for 
personal records91.  In most applications it was common for the defence to 
simply reiterate the grounds set out in O’Connor: asserting that the record may 
contain information about the events comprising the complaint of the assault; 
reveal the use of therapy which may have influenced the memory of the 
complainant; or that the record has information that may bear on the credibility of 
the complainant92.  After the case of Carosella93 the defence included that the 
records may contain a previous statement that may be inconsistent, may assist in 
cross-examination, or may disclose other witnesses.  In the case of J.C.B94 the 
judge went to great lengths to develop the reasons why records may be 
disclosed, listing amongst others: the mental condition of the complainant on the 
night of the assault; her expressed hatred toward men following the assault; her 
anger, whether it existed before the incident, whether it affected or affects her 
reliability or testimonial ability; whether something similar had happened before; 
whether she has had sexual relations with a man; whether she had consumed 
alcohol in the night of the assault.  The judge then goes on to say that these 
inquiries are not driven by myths and stereotypes regarding females – they are 
asked to determine if the complainant’s recollection could have been affected as 
a result of treatment or a form of treatment95.  He held that, on the statements of 
the complainant herself, it was clear that she had endured experiences that could 
well affect her credibility or competence96. 
 
                                                
90 Ibid at 193. 
91 K Busby ‘Third Party Records Cases Since R v O’Connor’ (2001) 27(3) Manitoba Law Journal 
356 at 375. 
92 Ibid. 
93 [1997] S.C.J. No. 12. 
94 [1997] P.I.E.J. No.26 (S.C.). 




The above review indicates the effect of the majority ruling in O’Connor and A.B.  
The discussion will now move to examining the legislation passed post O’Connor 
by the Canadian legislature, its constitutional challenge, and its effects, if any, in 





Bill C-46 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Bill’) came into operation on 12 may 
1997.  It contains underlying principles reflecting the concern of Parliament of the 
incidence of sexual violence against women and children in Canadian society.  
Parliament recognised the need to balance both the Charter rights of the 
accused and victims, and the need to reconcile those rights to the greatest extent 
possible, while also making clear Parliament’s desire to encourage the reporting 
of sexual violence and the counselling of victims. 
 
Broadly, the legislation differs from the majority decision in O’Connor in three 
respects.  Firstly, the two-step procedure from O’Connor applies to all records 
relating to the complainant and not only records that fall outside of the control 
and possession of the Crown98.  Secondly, the list of factors that the court must 
take into consideration before ordering production was expanded to include 
society’s interest in reporting sexual offences, encouraging counselling, and the 
effect on the integrity of the trial process99.  These factors must be weighed by 
the court at the first stage of the process to decide whether to review the records 
at all.  The provisions100 list examples of what would be considered insufficient to 
establish ‘likely relevance’, including mere assertions by the accused that: the 
record/s exist; the record relates to counselling or treatment; the record may 
relate to the credibility of the complainant, or the reliability of her testimony 
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merely because she received counselling; or the record relates to the 
complainant’s sexual activity with another person, or her sexual reputation. And 
finally, before the judge can order the production of records, the criterion 
‘necessary interests of justice’ must be satisfied. 
 
In summary, the key differences are that the initial test to be met by the accused 
is more stringent: the production of the document to the judge must not only be 
“likely relevant” but must also be “necessary in the interests of justice”101.  The 
accused must offer a realistic explanation why the records are sought, and the 
legislation is clear that mere speculation as to why the record may be relevant is 
not sufficient.  The accused must indicate in what way the record is directly 
relevant to an issue at trial and must know of the existence of the particular 
record.  It is clear that is not sufficient that situations such as alleging that the 
record may reveal that the complainant had in the past alleged that she had been 
sexually assaulted by another party would result in the record being made 
available.  These grounds however do not exclude the possibility of the judge 
reviewing the material to make a final decision on the relevance of the material.  
The judge may still then order that the material be made available to the defence. 
 
Women’s groups, such as those included in the coalition that participated in the 
O’Connor case, would have preferred that the legislation prohibited the 
production of records at any time, but did support the Bill as a positive 




The accused in this case sought the psychiatric, Child and Adolescent 
Association, and counselling records of a thirteen year old complainant on the 
grounds that the records might show that the complainant had fabricated the 
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allegations, that she had motive for doing so, and that she was highly suggestible 
to the influences of her counsellors.  The Bill had just come into effect, resulting 
in defence counsel challenging the legislation on constitutional grounds. 
 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defence identified five problems with the 
Bill, rendering it unconstitutional. This included the definition of records; the 
extension of the regime to records in the possession and control of the Crown; 
the ‘insufficient grounds’ section; the altered test for the production to the judge 
at the first stage of the application; and the factors to be considered at the 
second stage of the application104.  The argument of the complainant was that 
the provisions should be upheld as they ensured an appropriate balancing of the 
constitutional rights of the complainant and the accused105.  A similar coalition to 
that in O’Connor submitted an equality based argument in support of the Bill, 
arguing that the production of records is a practice of inequality.  Record 
production, it was argued, had an adverse impact on women and children, 
particularly those whose lives are heavily documented.  In addition, the 
overwhelming majority of applications occurred in sexual offences matters.  Of 
serious concern were the new myths that were developing with regard to the 
influence of counsellors and therapists had over their clients.  The coalition 
requested the Court to set clear guidelines on the interpretation of the Bill so as 
to ensure an outcome honouring the equality provisions of the Charter106. 
 
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Bill, outlining the rights at 
issue in the production context: the accused rights to liberty and to make a full 
answer and defence, and the complainant’s rights to privacy and to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure, to security of the person, and to equality, 
including an understanding of how myths and stereotypes may underlie an 
application for disclosure107.  The Court recognised that privacy was essential to 
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maintaining relationships of trust and that the counselling or therapeutic 
relationship was based on trust and confidentiality. 
 
There was however some concerns raised about the judgement by 
commentators such as Koshan108.  The first relates to waiver.  The Court held 
that waiver is for the complainant to make and not the record holder.  Mills did 
not recognise the possibility that a record holder may have an interest in 
protecting the record even where the complainant waives her right109.  Although 
Mills recognised the right of the record holder procedurally, in that the right to be 
heard (locus standi) was reiterated, the substantial rights of the record holder 
were not adequately addressed.  Although the position of this writer is that the 
right of disclosure should reside with the complainant (as will be argued later), 
the above scenario, where a record holder may have an interest in non-
disclosure, must be factored in when any court considers whether waiver has 
indeed occurred.  Considerations, such as the administration of justice, may play 
a role in deciding that the records should not be disclosed to the defence, in 
addition to interrogating why the complainant waived her right to protect 
disclosure. 
 
The second concern with Mills is the Court’s interpretation of the ‘insufficient 
grounds’ section110.  There are two possible interpretations of the sections. The 
first being that an assertion along the lines of the grounds listed is impermissible 
per se and will never be sufficient to support an application from the defence to 
disclose records.  The second possible interpretation is that an assertion is 
insufficient unless supported by evidence111. This would allow the defence to 
produce evidence, for example, that the record contains information about the 
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incident, and therefore the record must be disclosed.  The case law post Mills is 
evenly split on the interpretation of the section112. 
 
The main concern with Mills is the broad discretion left to trial judges to interpret 
the disclosure provisions.  Ultimately, the trial judge needs to consider the facts 
and make a finding that she or he considers to be ‘necessary in the interests of 
justice’.  The Court specifically noted and confirmed the discretionary nature of 
both stages of the production application113. 
 
It is important to briefly examine the effect of the Bill and Mills on production 
applications in Canada.  It is unfortunate to note that a variety of records continue 
to be sought by the defence, with counselling records the most widely sought.  
Applications are for multiple kinds of records, showing that ‘fishing expeditions’ 
have continued, and the motivation for production by the defence is similar in 
rationale to the time period before the Bill and Mills114.  The grounds mirror those 
presented by the defence prior to the Bill: questioning credibility and reliability of 
the complainant. Examples include alleging the presence of prior inconsistent 
statements, motive to fabricate, false memory syndrome, history of lying, and 
behavioural concerns115.  Busby’s research in 2001 indicated that judges ordered 
disclosure in two-thirds of applications by the defence prior to the Bill.  In post-Bill 
applications, half of the disclosure applications resulted in the record being 
disclosed to the accused.  Other research has suggested that there is little in the 
judgements that order disclosure to indicate the reasoning of the judge as the 
courts often simply parrot the language of the legislation116.  Another concern in 
post-Bill cases is that although both complainants and record holders have the 
right to be represented in court during disclosure applications, this occurs in very 
few cases117.  Representation of this nature is essential as it is not possible for 
                                                
112 Ibid. 
113 Koshan op cit at 673. 
114 Ibid at 681. 
115 Ibid and Busby (2001) op cit at 382. 




Crown counsel to represent the equality and privacy interests of complainants 
and record holders. 
 
With regard to missing or destroyed evidence, the Supreme Court in Carosella118 
ruled that the destruction of records was fatal to the prosecution of the case as 
they ‘might have been able to shed light on the unfolding of events’ or ‘might 
have contained information bearing on the complainant’s credibility’119.  The 
minority however noted that this decision was contrary to previous Supreme 
Court decisions where the accused had to show prejudice flowing from the lost 
evidence.  On a slightly positive note, later judgements confirmed that Carosella 
was restricted to situations where the destruction the records was deliberate and 
implicated the state120. 
 
While the legal developments in Canada have aspects of real protection for 
complainants of sexual assault matters, it is submitted that the discretion vested 
in judicial officers allows for the continued application of myths and stereotypes 
about women and children under the guise of the ‘interests of justice and fair 
trial’.  These are important lessons for South Africa to consider, as the need for 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
This section will explore the legal developments in the United States of America 
(hereinafter the ‘US’) as relates to disclosure of personal records of sexual 
assault complainants.  Both the federal position as well as the position in a few 
states will be discussed, including the rationale behind the legislative provisions 
and judicial interpretations thereof. 
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The US generally has recognised that following a sexual assault, complainants 
are faced with questions and decisions while in a state of trauma.  The 
importance of counsellors in this situation, to act as support persons, and to give 
advice and information to the victim, has also been recognised.  As a result of 
this recognition, most states have enacted evidentiary privileges to protect 
information that is exchanged between the victim and her counsellor121.  The 
approach used by the Americans differs somewhat to that of the Canadians in 
that the issue of protection of communications between a sexual assault victim 
and her counsellor is couched in the legal right of privilege.  The debates 
however are basically the same, focussing on a balancing (or not, in the case of 
an absolute privilege) of the rights of the accused and complainant, and the issue 
of relevance. 
 
As with most jurisdictions, the US has a fundamental evidentiary rule guiding the 
introduction of evidence: ‘the public has a right to every man’s (sic) evidence’122.  
This principle is reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 402 that declares ‘all 
relevant evidence is admissible’.  There are a number of Rules that exclude 
certain evidence on the grounds that it is irrelevant, unreliable or prejudicial 
evidence that would detrimentally affect the truth-seeking process.  Evidentiary 
privilege, by contrast, excludes evidence that may well be relevant, reliable and 
not prejudicial.  These privileges elevate other important societal interests and 
policies above truth seeking, such as privacy interests.  In view of the fact that 
these rules exclude possible relevant evidence, the courts disfavour them123.  
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However, there are generally accepted privileges, such as spousal and attorney-
client. 
 
Federal Rule 501 gave the federal courts guidance in answering the question as 
to whether new privileges should be recognised by instructing them to follow ‘the 
principles of common law…in the light of reason and experience’.  In addition to 
this instruction, most courts in considering this question typically consider four 
criteria formulated by Wigmore: (1) the communication must originate in a 
confidence that they will not be disclosed; (2) this element of confidentiality must 
be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between 
the parties; (3) the relation must be one which in the opinion of the community 
ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4) the injury that would inure to the 
relationship by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the 
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation124.  These criteria are 
important to note as they have been used in many jurisdictions to consider 
whether communications are privileged, including South Africa, discussed below. 
 
In Jaffee v Redmond125 the United States Supreme Court held that ‘confidential 
communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the 
course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled disclosure under 
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence’126.  This judgment recognised the 
possibility of the extension of the law of privilege, adopting an evolutionary 
approach to privilege.  Briefly, the Court in coming to its conclusion, examined 
whether such a privilege ‘promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the 
need for probative evidence’127.  It examined both the private and public interests 
that the privilege serves, holding that, in relation to the private interest, the 
privilege is ‘rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust’ and that the 
relationship is dependent on ‘an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the 
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patient discloses sensitive and personal information to her counsellor’128.  In 
turning to the public interest, the court held that the privilege ‘facilitates the 
provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental 
or emotional problem’ and that ‘the mental health of our citizenry…is a public 
good of transcendent importance’129.  The Court recognised that a denial of the 
privilege would ‘chill’ conversations between patients and therapists130.  The 
Court therefore held that ‘confidential communications between a licensed 
psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are 
protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 501…’131.  The majority also 
recognised that the privilege be extended to social workers as they essentially 
provided the same services to patients, and that social workers, as opposed to 
psychotherapist, are used more often as they are more affordable. 
 
What is most important is that Jaffee recognised the privilege as absolute, which 
is broader than the privilege recognised in most states.  The Court rejected the 
balancing test holding that ‘making a promise of confidentiality contingent on a 
trial judge’s later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient’s interest in 
privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the 
effectiveness of the privilege’132.  Insightfully, the Court held that uncertainty as to 
whether the privilege would be upheld amounted to little better than no privilege 
at all133. 
 
The basic criticism of Rule 501 and Jaffee is that little guidance is given in 
extending the privilege in the states.  This is mainly due to Jaffee creating a 
vague and ill-defined privilege134.  There is uncertainty as to what the Court 
meant by ‘a licensed psychotherapist’ (i.e. what groups/professionals are 
considered psychotherapist) and ‘course of psychotherapy’, the issue of an 
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absolute or restricted privilege, whether the privilege covers written records only, 
whether the balancing test should be used, and finally the issue of waiver of the 
privilege.  This paper does not allow for an extensive analysis of these criticisms, 
suffice to say that most of these uncertainties have not been clarified, and must 
be considered closely when making recommendations for the South African 
situation. 
 
One issue, that of absolute or restricted privilege, however will be canvassed.  As 
stated above, Jaffee recognised that relying on an uncertain judge’s evaluation 
would negate the effectiveness of the privilege135.  However, because the Court 
left the lower courts to interpret the contours of the privilege, it has become 
vulnerable to limitation.  Despite Jaffee’s explicit rejection of the balancing test, 
cases, for example Lowe, a Massachusetts case, held that the constitutional due 
process rights (similar to the South African rights of the accused to a fair trial) 
had to be weighed against the privileges of another.  This position was justified 
by the Lowe court as it reasoned that the Jaffee court had intended a balancing 
test as Jaffee had considered the important public and private interests 
underlying the privilege outweighed the ‘modest’ evidentiary benefit that would 





Section 20J of the Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 233, provides an 
absolute privilege regarding confidential communications between a sexual 
assault complainant and a sexual assault counsellor137, stating that ‘a sexual 
assault counsellor shall not disclose such confidential communications, without 
the prior written consent of the victim’.  The statute makes provision for an 
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absolute privilege governing rape counselling records and provides that ‘such 
confidential communications shall not be subject to discovery and shall not be 
inadmissible in any criminal or civil proceedings without the prior written consent 
of the victim’.  This provision has been challenged by the defence on the grounds 
that it offends against the accused’s constitutional rights to confront witnesses 
testifying against him138, and his right to a fair trial (due process right)139.  The 
position of victims was that the privilege was absolute and never warranted 
disclosure absent of the consent of the victim140.  The courts of Massachusetts 
have therefore heard a number of cases where it has attempted to balance these 
competing interests. 
 
In 1986, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided the first case 
regarding access to privilege records in Commonwealth v Two Juveniles141.  The 
court held that in certain circumstances the absolute privilege in section 20J must 
yield at trial to the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to have access to 
privilege records142, with the proviso that the defendant has to show that there 
was a legitimate need for access to the communications.  Although the court 
established this test, it did not define exactly how this standard was to be met.  
Significantly, the court held that once the legitimate need test had been met the 
records would be reviewed in camera by the judge to look for any evidence that 
may indicate that the witness had bias or motive to lie, in which case the records 
would be given to the accused143. 
 
The United States Supreme Court endorsed the in camera review in 
Pennsylvania v Ritchie144.  This was upheld in consideration of the accused’s 
right to a fair trial (due process), holding that the accused was entitled to 
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‘material’ evidence145.  The court further held that the right to a fair trial was fully 
protected by an in camera review of the records146. 
 
In 1991, the case of Commonwealth v Stockhammer147 the court rejected the in 
camera review and allowed the defence direct access to the records.  The basis 
for this decision is that the court found that there was a potential for confusion of 
roles, as the judge is not in the best position to determine what evidence is 
necessary to the defence.  The court interestingly went to great lengths to say 
that it recognised the need to assist sexual assault victims, but then contradicted 
itself by undermining that importance by granting direct access of records to the 
defence148.  The effect of this decision was devastating, with many victims 
refusing to access counselling services following a sexual assault, or not wanting 
to report the matter to the police for fear of their records being disclosed at a later 
stage in court149. 
 
Commonwealth v Bishop150 marked a return to the in camera review procedure.  
It held that the defence had to show as a threshold that the ‘records privileged by 
the statute are likely to contain relevant evidence’151.  If this test could be met, 
the records would be reviewed by the judge in camera.  The court distinguished 
itself from Stockhammer as it would only review information that it had 
determined ‘likely relevant’152.  The court recognised the legislative intent of the 
statute to protect victims and indicates a return to the balancing of the rights of 
victims and the accused.  The test advanced by the court requires the accused to 
advance some factual basis for how the record is likely to be relevant153.  This 
case did not go far enough, effectively holding that the privilege was qualified and 
not absolute, as envisaged by the legislature. 
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In 1996, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld a stricter standard to apply to 
situations where the defence wanted access to the victim’s confidential 
communications.  In Commonwealth v Fuller154 the court held that the defence 
must show a ‘good faith, specific and reasonable basis for believing that the 
records will contain exculpatory evidence which is relevant and material to the 
issue of his guilt’ in order for the judge to order an in camera inspection of the 
records155.  The court held that the ‘likely to be relevant ‘ test is too broad and 
would result in all records being reviewed in camera.  It went on to recognise that 
victims needed assurance that their communications would remain privileged in 
order for victims to access the services of counselling groups and to make full 
disclosure to the counsellor and benefit from the process.  It understood the need 
for an absolute privilege which not only would allow victims to access these 
counselling services, but would also support the reporting of rape.  But, in certain 
circumstances, the defence must have access to these records ‘so as not to 
undermine confidence in the outcome of trial’156.  Arguments for the victims and 
record holders in this case included the point that records should not be 
disclosed under any circumstances, and if they were, only where the accused 
could show that the victim had intentionally undertaken to distort the truth-finding 
process157. 
 
While Fuller went some way to improving the rights of victims in the disclosure of 
records arena in developing new strict discovery standards, it still falls short of 
the absolute privilege advocated by many feminist lawyers158.  This case did 
however formulate the procedural and substantial aspects of the application 
procedure to be followed in sexual assault trials: the defendant must file a written 
notice for production explaining his reasons for doing so; the motion must allege 
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that thorough research proves that the material is not available elsewhere; the 
custodian of the records must be given notice and be given an opportunity to be 
heard; and the defence must show good faith, specific and reasonable basis for 
believing that the records will contain exculpatory evidence which is relevant and 
material to the issue of the defendant’s guilt159.  Most significantly, the court 
precisely defined ‘materiality’ as that which is ‘not only likely to meet criteria of 
admissibility’ but which would also ‘tend to create a reasonable doubt that does 
not otherwise exist’160.  Some commentators believe that Fuller is a fair decision 
and in no way compromises the rights of the accused.  These commentators also 
endorsed the strict standard for rape crisis counselling records, supporting the 
position of the court that its decision was based on the special nature of the 
counsellor-victim privilege because ‘the very circumstances of the 
communications indicate they are likely to be relevant to an issue in the case’161. 
 
As a general comment on the approach taken by both the federal and state 
legislatures and courts in relation to the disclosure of personal records of sexual 
assault victims, it is submitted that it is with circumspection that the reliance on 
privilege is depended upon to protect the information contained in these records.  
The very basis of the concept of privilege is that evidence exists that is prima 
facie relevant, evidence that the courts would normally have presented to them to 
make a just finding making use of the truth-finding process.  This privileged 
evidence becomes inadmissible based upon a legally recognised relationship, 
the communications emanating from which are deemed by the law and informed 
by policy considerations to be protected from judicial and public (through 
evidence in court) scrutiny.  It is submitted that a different approach is more 
appropriate in this context to protect these communications – this information / 
evidence is not admissible as it is irrelevant at all times.  To argue that it is 
relevant is to depend on the myths and stereotypes that inform the prejudiced 
positions held by most people on women and children and sexual assault.  It is 
                                                
159 Burke op cit at 176. 
160 Fuller op cit at 855. 
161 Murphy op cit at 21. 
 
 38
these very people, like the court in Fuller who believe that communications 
between a victim and her counsellor are, by default, relevant, and a special 




ENGLAND AND WALES 
 
 
It has become standard practice in England and Wales for the defence to seek 
access to documentation of the complainant in sexual assault trials as part of a 
strategy to undermine the credibility of the complainant162.  Documentation that is 
not ordinarily in the possession of the prosecution is not subject to the normal 
disclosure rules, necessitating the defence to make use of section 2 of the 
Criminal Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965, as amended by section 
66 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA).  This section 
provides that where the court is satisfied that a person is likely to be able to give 
material evidence or produce any document or thing likely to be material 
evidence, and the person will not voluntarily attend court as a witness or produce 
the document or thing, the court may issue a summons.  Section 2 then provides 
procedural rules, stipulating the need for an application setting out the reasons 
why the applicant believes that the evidence is material evidence and why the 
holder will not voluntarily disclose it.  The applicant must give notice to the 
evidence holder, and inform her/him of her/his right to representations in writing 
and at the hearing.  The hearing is held in private163. 
 
There are weaknesses with section 2.  There is no requirement for the 
complainant to be notified about the application, and no provision for her to be 
legally represented.  The prosecution in under no obligation to protect her privacy 
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and may not even oppose the application.  The holder of the evidence is left to 
defend the rights of the complainant, which they may or may not do164. 
 
The critical issue to be decided upon by the court in considering an application 
for disclosure will be the determination of what is ‘material’ to the case.  In R v 
Derby Magistrates Court, ex parte B165 the meaning of the word ‘material’ was 
discussed in relation to a provision in another piece of legislation166.  This court 
held that the section could not be used to obtain discovery of documents for use 
in cross-examination167.  A rigorous distinction was drawn between documents in 
the possession of the prosecution and those in the possession of a third party.  A 
stringent duty to disclose attaches to the former, while no duty exists in regard to 
the latter.  For evidence to be material evidence it must not only be relevant to 
the issues raised in the criminal proceedings but also admissible as such in 
evidence.  Evidence requested merely for the purpose of cross-examination is 
not admissible, and therefore not material168.  The principles of Derby’s case 
have been held to apply to section 2.  In R v Azmy169 the defence sought to 
access the counselling records of the complainant, found that the request for 
disclosure was to equip the accused with material for cross-examination.  In 
determining whether the records were admissible, the court held that the records 
had to contain material which ‘might positively advance the defence case’170.  
Temkin171 finds this decision hardly surprising as she contends that rape 
counselling records will rarely constitute ‘material evidence’.  She explains this 
position by maintaining that the context of record making dictates that the 
counsellor is only marginally concerned with the details of the actual sexual 
assault, but is rather more concerned with dealing with the victim’s state of mind, 
and her feelings such as distress and fear.  The record may also contain 
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perceptions of the counsellor172.  Therefore the counselling records cannot be 
regarded as a reliable record of the sexual assault incident.  Secondly, the record 
is not ratified by the victim herself and may therefore be inaccurate.  And thirdly, 
the victim may express self-blame, which is normal for sexual assault victims.  
These thoughts and feelings relate to the inner world of the victim, and not to the 
external reality of what has occurred173.  Temkin is thus of the opinion that 
parties who contest disclosure will have a good chance of success.  It is 
submitted that this would, once again, be largely dependent on the judicial officer 
in a particular case, and her or his interpretation of relevance. 
 
A second option available to a third party wanting to resist disclosing the records 
of a sexual assault victim is to claim public interest immunity on the grounds that 
a confidential relationship exists and that disclosure would be in breach of some 
ethical or social value involving public interest174.  The Code of Practice of the 
CPIA refers to ‘material given in confidence’ as sensitive material which it may be 
considered not to be in the public interest to disclose175.  The court in Azmy held 
that public interest immunity applied to counselling records, and in R v 
Higgins176, the court held that the local authority holding files of a victim had a 
positive duty to apply for public interest immunity177.  The court must perform a 
balancing act between the public interest in the absence of disclosure with the 
interests of justice.  The interests of justice in this context are taken to mean the 
fairness to the accused178.  In Higgins the court ordered the disclosure of some 
of the records on the grounds that they had a bearing on the reliability of the 
complainant.  In the opinion of the court, the documents suggested that the 
complainant (a child) had a lively imagination, liked to make up stories and that 
fact and fiction were closely linked in his mind179. 
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While the public interest immunity strategy is an option in attempting to protect 
records, it is submitted that, as with most options other than a blanket or absolute 
protection of records of sexual assault victims, it is limited in practice, as the 
same myths and stereotypes continue to inform what is to be produced, 





Recently, defence counsel have been following an overseas trend of seeking 
access to counselling records of sexual assault victims.  The purpose of this is to 
expose potential exculpatory evidence in favour of the accused180.  New Zealand 
is currently in a very similar position as South Africa, in that there are no specific 
legal provisions that regulate requests for access and recognise the competing 
interests of the complainant and the accused.  The current methods of choice in 
New Zealand will be discussed as well as judicial interpretation thereof, with 
accompanying criticism, as it is the opinion of New Zealand writers that these 
methods and judicial rulings are unclear, unwieldy and not reflective of the 
important interests at stake181. 
 
R v Dobson182 set out the only procedure available for accessing personal 
material of the complainant in the hands of third parties.  The ‘Dobson procedure’ 
makes use of a subpoena or witness summons to compel a third party to bring 
the material to court or to give evidence at the trial183.  Once the subpoena is 
received, the witness may choose to either disclose the material or resist 
production.  With regard to resisting production, there is nothing in New Zealand 
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law that the witness may rely on, such as a specific privilege protecting medical 
or counselling records as a general class of documents184.  The only avenue 
potentially open for a witness to resist production and/or testifying is contained in 
section 35 of the Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980.  This section confers a 
judicial discretion to excuse any witness from producing a document on the 
grounds that to do so would constitute a breach of a confidence, having regard to 
the special relationship that exists between the witness and her or his 
confidant185.  The judicial officer is required to weigh the public interest in having 
the evidence disclosed to court, and the public interest in the preservation in 
keeping confidences and the encouragement of free communications in the 
‘special relationship’186.  The judge must consider three things: the likely 
significance of the evidence in resolving issues to be decided at trial; the nature 
of the confidence and the special relationship between the witness and the 
confidant; and the effect of disclosure on the confidant or any other person187.  
The courts in R v Secord188 defined a ‘special relationship’ as a ‘relationship of a 
kind that would encourage the imparting of confidences and that has a public 
interest in it’189.  Once this aspect of the test is satisfied the judge must exercise 
discretion in balancing the competing rights of a fair trial and the confidentiality 
issues.  The judge will generally inspect the records before making a ruling190. 
 
The above procedure is considered unsatisfactory for the defence, the 
complainant, the record holder, and for the justice system itself191.  The argument 
from the defence can be summarised as follows: in most sexual assault trials the 
central issue is that of consent, and the court must decide between two versions, 
that of the accused and the complainant.  Most often than not, there are no 
eyewitnesses.  It is for these reasons that the defence argue that therapeutic or 
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counselling records of the complainant take on importance as potential sources 
of exculpatory information192.  These records may contain admissions of conduct 
that may have led the accused to believe that the complainant was consenting to 
the sexual conduct of the accused, or admissions by the complainant that the 
sexual assault was invented.  They go on to argue that they cannot determine 
whether records may be useful or not without having access to them to inspect 
them, and it is for this reason that disclosure should be ordered193.  While the 
courts are cognisant of the accused’s rights, they are also concerned with the 
rights of the complainant to privacy and are unwilling to condone ‘fishing 
expeditions’.  This has resulted in the courts placing an evidentiary burden on the 
accused to demonstrate why the records are needed and what use they will 
serve194.  This burden of proof has been legislated in other countries such as 
Canada195.   
 
The defence however in New Zealand have argued that a burden of proof that is 
set too high may breach the fundamental rights of the accused to a fair trial196 by 
denying access to all evidence necessary to present his defence.  This may in 
turn lead to a wrongful conviction197.  A Canadian case most quoted by the 
defence is R v Ross198 to illustrate this point where the complainant allegedly had 
reacted violently to the accused when they had begun to engage in consensual 
sex.  The accused had held her by the wrists to contain her, resulting in bruising.  
The complainant thereafter laid charges of attempted rape and indecent assault 
against the accused.  The complainant’s psychiatrist read about the trial, and 
approached the prosecutor with information about the complainant’s childhood 
which may have caused her to misconstrue the lawful conduct of the accused as 
attempted rape.  This case therefore demonstrates that information contained in 
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private records may prove to be exculpatory and prevent wrongful convictions199.  
In addition to this, the defence argue that the procedural requirements placed on 
the defence to obtain records are burdensome.  The information can only be 
potentially obtained at the time of trial and not pre-trial, not allowing them 
sufficient time to review and possibly alter defence strategy, and thus impeding 
the ability to prepare adequately for cross-examination200. 
 
Apart from the many consequences that complainants suffer as result of a sexual 
assault that have been discussed at length in this paper, there are specific 
experiences of the trial process that are particular such as humiliation, 
embarrassment, and re-victimisation.  Several ‘rape-shield’ law have been 
passed in New Zealand, as in other jurisdictions, but the personal records 
procedure has no regard for the important societal concerns that fuelled the 
passage of the above pieces of legislation201.  It is the submission of New 
Zealand authors that the complainant has a privacy interest, an equality interest 
and a therapeutic recovery interest in protecting these records from disclosure, 
none of which are being recognised by the current framework202. 
 
The right to privacy in New Zealand is recognised in the section 21 of the Bill of 
Rights which provides that ‘everyone has the right to be secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure, whether of the person, property, 
correspondence or otherwise’.  In Attorney –General v Otahuhu District Court203 
it was recognised that third party rights to privacy must be considered along with 
fair trial rights of the defendant's204.  The court went on to say that the rights to a 
fair trial were not necessarily the only important rights to consider in the criminal 
process, and where third party records are being sought by the accused, a 
conflict of rights in term of the Bill of Rights is recognised.  While section 35 of 
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the Evidence Amendment Act, discussed above, contemplates a consideration of 
privacy rights, the procedure in practice fails to protect the privacy rights of the 
complainant.  This is demonstrated by the lack of a requirement to notify the 
complainant that the defence has served a subpoena on the holder of her 
personal records, and no legal obligation on the record holder to inform the 
complainant that the records have been subpoenaed205.  Even once the records 
have been handed to the defence, there is no provision placing a duty on any 
party, including the court, to inform the complainant.  Although section 35 
requires that the court must consider the effect of disclosure on the confidant, no 
provision is made for the complainant to be present or represented at the 
proceedings.  It remains in the discretion of the court as to whether to grant locus 
standi to the complainant, based on its inherent jurisdiction206.  A further criticism 
of section 35, based on its wording, is that it is unclear whether some counselling 
relationships would fall within its protection207.  Even if the counselling 
relationship were deemed a ‘special relationship’ it is unclear whether all 
information arising out of the confidential sessions would be covered or only 
actual communications between the victim and counsellor.  The counsellor’s 
observations may not be covered and she may therefore be pressed to testify 
about this. 
 
Possibly the most problematic aspect of section 35 is the fact that the privilege is 
vested in the record holder and not the complainant.  This makes the 
complainant wholly dependent on the counsellor to raise the privilege.  If the 
privilege is waived by the record holder, there is no recourse for the complainant 
to prevent the disclosure.  This is of course contrary to the Canadian situation, as 
recognised in Mills, that the privacy rights of the complainant cannot be ignored 
simply because the records have been disclosed to the prosecution.  This is 
legislated for in Bill C-46 in sections 278.5 and 278.7.  As a final criticism of 
section 35, the procedure allows for the inspection of the records by the judge in 
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making a decision.  This fails to recognise that the judge’s inspection itself is a 
breach of privacy208. 
 
Although the effects of disclosure on the complainant’s recovery process and on 
the criminal justice system/administration of justice are discussed in detail 
elsewhere in this paper, it is however important to note that these effects are 
echoed in all jurisdictions that this writer researched.  New Zealand is no 
exception, and had documented that as a result of disclosure, counsellors have 
commented that it is difficult to establish relationships of trust with sexual assault 
victims as their revelations about their feelings and thoughts following a sexual 
assault may be disclosed to the very person that has perpetrated the offence209.  
Record holders are also placed in the invidious position of having to choose 
between conflicting ethical obligations of confidentiality to their client and the 
legal obligations to submit to a subpoena.  Consequences of not complying with 
a subpoena vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but most involve the possibility of 
some form of incarceration.  Consequences of this nature make it very difficult to 
expect counsellors to resist subpoenas to protect their clients.  Other methods 
are being used the world over to protect information, but again this is far from 
ideal, and may result in counsellors being charged with defeating the ends 
justice.  With regard to the consequences for the justice system, disclosure has 
resulted in fewer women reporting sexual assault in New Zealand, specifically 
identifying disclosure as the reason for refusing to contact law enforcement 
authorities210.  This leads to impairing the administration of justice by preventing 
the apprehension of offenders, resulting in more victimisation in the 
community211.  Complainants that have reported to police may either withdraw 
charges once their records are subpoenaed, or may withdraw from the 
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counselling process, or censor themselves, once warned by counsellors that 
records may be subpoenaed212. 
 
Writers in New Zealand213 have also questioned the relevance of personal 
records in the sexual assault trial, once again echoing the concerns of their 
colleagues in other jurisdictions.  They question the use of records in assisting 
the court in its truth-finding process as records cannot be said to be reliable for 
the purposes for which they are ostensibly sought, as they may contain 
subjective observations of the counsellor, and have not been subsequently 
verified by the victim.  If the main purpose of using records is to discredit 
complainants, showing them to be unreliable and morally unworthy, then the 
legislative intent behind other ‘rape-shield’ provisions is undermined.  By allowing 
sexual assault trial proceedings to be diverted away from the determination of 
fact to discussions of credibility by relying on stereotypes and myths associated 




AUSTRALIA – NEW SOUTH WALES 
 
In December 1995 the co-ordinator of the Canberra Rape Crisis Centre Di Lucas 
refused to comply with a subpoena that required her to produce a counselling file 
in relation to a sexual assault complainant215.  She was sentenced by the judge 
to imprisonment in the Court’s watch house, and was released four hours later on 
condition that she provide to the court the subpoenaed file in a locked briefcase 
to which she alone knew the combination.  The question of access to the file by 
the defence was decided at a later hearing216.  This case received a great deal of 
publicity and public debate about the lack of legal provisions available at that 
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time for confidential communications between a counsellor and a sexual assault 
victim.  This debate culminated in the introduction of a sexual assault 
communications privilege (SACP) in the state of New South Wales.  This 
privilege prevents disclosure of communications made for the purpose of 
counselling a complainant of a sexual assault in circumstances prescribed by the 
provisions of the legislation.  As a result of the tension between attempts by 
Parliament to implement a strict, broad and effective privilege, and the restrictive 
interpretations of the legislation by the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal, the legislation has been amended a number of times.  This section of the 
paper will discuss the various provisions of the SACP, judicial interpretation and 
amendments to the provisions. 
 
As illustrated by the example above, prior to the passing of the SACP provisions, 
there were no specific privileges that existed between sexual assault victims and 
counsellors.  The regular provisions of criminal procedure allowed for the 
defence to subpoena witnesses and records for trial purposes, leaving the record 
holder with little choice other than to produce the record and testify (or be 
imprisoned).  In the 1970’s and 1980’s a number of ‘rape-shield’ laws and 
procedures were passed to reduce some of the trauma suffered by sexual 
assault victims at the hands of the criminal justice system217.  Concerns were 
raised when it became evident that defence lawyers were attempting the 
circumvent ‘rape-shield’ laws by accessing subpoenaed counsellor’s notes in 
order to discredit victims by exposing details of their personal histories, for 
example, previous psychiatric treatment, drug and alcohol problems, terminations 
of pregnancies, having ex-nuptial children and rebellious childhood histories218. 
 
As with other jurisdictions where legislation has been passed specifically creating 
a sexual assault communications privilege, there is continued opposition in 
Australia to the legislation, especially from defence lawyers.  The basis of their 
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objection is not dissimilar from their international colleagues, pleading for the 
rights of the accused to a fair trial, and the possibility of a miscarriage of justice 
by wrongful conviction.  A common criticism of the privilege is that it prevents 
disclosure of a counselling note that would reveal that the complaint of the sexual 
assault was a ‘recovered memory’ which arose after counselling or 
hypnotherapy219. 
 
In justifying the passing of the legislation, the Hon. Jeff Shaw QC MLC, the then 
Attorney General of New South Wales, used the rationale that victims often seek 
counselling, and the relationship with a counsellor must be built on trust and 
confidentiality in order for it to be effective.  Any possibility of that trust and 
confidentiality being broken will result in victims not accessing these vital 
services.  That the perpetrator may have sight of these records only serves to 
further traumatise the victim.  He was particularly persuaded by the arguments 
that were made in favour of a privilege that included that the primary purpose of 
counselling is therapeutic and not investigative and are not verified by the victim, 
thus making counselling notes unreliable.  The consequences of not having a 
privilege were disastrous for victims and counsellors, leading to situations, 
amongst others, where victims would not report sexual assaults, and counsellors 
would either not take notes or refuse to hand over notes220. 
 
The first challenge to the SACP came in R v Young221.  The court held that the 
privilege could only be invoked at the adduction of evidence stage and not at an 
earlier stage, when the documents are produced upon subpoena.  The effect of 
this decision was that it negated the purposes of privilege222, as the documents 
would have already been disclosed to the defence and the privacy of the 
complainant invaded.  The privilege was in turn strengthened by an amendment 
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to the legislation that expressly applied the privilege to the production of 
documents upon subpoena223. 
 
The SACP provisions may be claimed to prevent production of a document 
recording a protected confidence or the adducing of evidence disclosing a 
protected confidence224.  A ‘protected confidence’ is a ‘counselling 
communication that is made by, or to or about a victim or alleged victim in a 
sexual assault offence’225.  The definition of ‘counselling communication’ 
incorporates all communications by, to or about the alleged victim made in 
confidence in the course of counselling226.  The court must enter into a balancing 
exercise.  A document recording a protected confidence cannot be produced and 
evidence disclosing a protected confidence or the contents of a document 
recording a protected confidence cannot be adduced unless the court is satisfied 
that: the document or evidence has substantial probative value; other evidence of 
the protected confidence is not available; and the public interest in preserving the 
confidentiality of the protected confidences and protecting the principle protected 
confider from harm is substantially outweighed by the public interest in allowing 
inspection of the document (or admission of the tendered evidence)227.  As part 
of the balancing exercise the court must take into account the likelihood, and the 
nature or extent of the harm that would be caused by the victim if the document 
is produced or the evidence adduced228.  ‘Harm’ is defined by the legislation in 
the interpretation of section 295, as including actual physical bodily harm, 
financial loss, stress or shock, damage to reputation or emotional or 
psychological harm (such as shame, humiliation and fear).  Section 299 of the 
legislation provides for notice to be given by the defence (or any party requiring 
production) to each other party and the protected confider (the victim).  Evidence 
is not to be adduced unless such notice is given.  Consent to disclose documents 
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may be given, but is not effective unless it is given by the principle protected 
confider229. 
 
The provisions of the legislation were challenged for a second time in R v 
Norman Lee230.  The provisions that the court in Lee considered related to 
counselling.  A ‘counselling communication’ meant a communication ‘ …made in 
confidence…in the course of a relationship in which the counsellor is counselling, 
giving therapy to or treating the counselled person for any emotional or 
psychological condition231…’232.  The court in Lee interpreted ‘any emotional 
condition’ as a ‘condition which reveals or reflects some defect or illness or 
disease or abnormality’ and a psychological condition as ‘a state of health which 
is poor or abnormal or diseased or otherwise defective from the emotional or 
psychological point of view…some defect or illness or disease or abnormality in 
the victim’s mental states and processes’233.  The section therefore required, 
according to the court, that a recognisable psychiatric illness be established for 
which a diagnosis was necessary.  The criticism of this interpretation was that 
most victims of sexual assault do not develop recognisable psychiatric illnesses 
but simply experience normal reactions such as humiliation, shame and fear.  In 
order for the privilege to operate, the victim would have to be declared mentally 
ill, adding to her victimisation. 
 
Further, the court held in relation to the term ‘counselling’ that it referred to 
‘…provision of expert advice and procedures by persons skilled, by training or 
experience, in the treatment of mental or emotional disease or trouble’234.  This 
narrow interpretation of counselling would exclude most lay counsellors at rape 
crisis centres.  These interpretations had the effect of many victims discontinuing 
counselling, or not seeking counselling following a sexual assault. 
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The legislature responded to the judgment by once again changing the 
provisions.  The provisions now reflect a wider definition of counsellor, as well as 
the ‘type’ of assistance that can be given to a victim, avoiding the necessity of the 
victim being diagnosed as mentally ill.  Section 296(5) defines a person who is 
counselling as someone who has undertaken training or study or has experience 
that is relevant to the process of counselling persons who have suffered harm; 
and counselling occurs when the counsellor listens to and gives verbal or other 
support or encouragement to another person, or advises, gives therapy to or 
treats the other person, whether for a fee or reward. 
 
The New South Wales legislation, although not creating an absolute privilege for 
sexual assault victims or declaring all evidence from third parties irrelevant and 
therefore inadmissible, does offer some real protection for victims.  This writer 
was unable to obtain information as to the effectiveness of the changes to the 
legislation in preventing access to this information, or whether it has had any 





In Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to respect for 
private life is enshrined.  The Article states that there should be no interference 
from a public authority in relation to the exercise of this right except where it is 
necessary235.  Exceptions or limitations to rights must be narrowly interpreted, 
and any interference must be necessary in a democratic society.  In assessing 
whether there is a pressing social need for interference, or that the means to 
impair the right or freedom is no more than is necessary to accomplish the 
legitimate objective, a proportionality test must be used236.  First, the measures 
                                                




employed must be fair and not arbitrary, designed to achieve the objective in 
question and rationally connected to that objective.  Secondly, the limitation or 
interference should impair the right as little as possible. And thirdly, there must 
be proportionality between the effects of the limiting measure and the 
objective237.  These guidelines, endorsed by the European Court of Human 
Rights238 suggest that, when applied to the disclosure of records or sexual 
assault victims, courts may not act irrationally or unfairly by relying on myths and 





At present there is no legal provision, either at common law or in statute, that 
provides any protection specifically for victims of sexual assault or those who 
offer victims any form of support, be it counselling, medical treatment or 
psychiatric care, from the accused accessing their personal records in trial 
proceedings.  There is also no literature or case law on this particular point, 
although there is currently an interlocutory application before the High Court in 
the KwaZulu Provincial Division240, originating from a criminal case in the 
Pietermaritzburg Regional Court241, which contains elements of disclosure of 
sexual assault victims’ records to the accused.  This case will be discussed in 
some detail below.  Relevance, admissibility and inadmissibility of evidence have 
been discussed in detail above.  With those discussions in mind, the following 
section will explore the various methods that may be used by the accused in 
accessing the personal records of a sexual assault victim for trial purposes.  The 
options that may be available to the complainant, the record holder and the 
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prosecution, to resist access will then be explored, interrogating the concepts of 
privilege, and the Constitutional242 rights of privacy243 and equality244. 
 
The Constitutional Court held in Shabalala v The Attorney General of the 
Transvaal and Another245 that the common law pertaining to the contents of a 
police docket, which amounted to a ‘blanket docket privilege’, was 
unconstitutional.  The court held that in order to ensure that the rights of the 
accused to a fair trial as enshrined in the Constitution246 are upheld, the accused 
was entitled to access of the statements of witnesses.  In certain circumstances 
access could be justifiably denied247, but the basic principle held that the 
accused has access to the police docket.  The importance of this judgment in this 
context is that access was not authorized by the court to any information that is 
not in the docket, thereby excluding any duty on the prosecution to inform or 
disclose any information that may be held by third parties in relation to the 
complainant.  It is however trite law that the prosecution is by law obliged to 
disclose any information to the accused and the court which would further the 
administration of justice, including the right to a fair trial, including exculpatory 
evidence for the accused. 
 
The most common method of securing a witness to attend trial and/or produce a 
document at trial is to issue a subpoena in terms of section 179 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA).  The person issued with a subpoena duces 
tecum must either have some degree of custody of the document or control 
before she or he can be compelled to produce it248. 
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Section 205 of the CPA also provides a mechanism for a court (a judge, regional 
court magistrate or magistrate) to secure the attendance of a witness at trial.  
However, the provisions only allow for the prosecution to make a request to the 
court for the witness’ attendance, and not the defence.  It is therefore submitted 
that unless the prosecution was desirous of obtaining the personal records of the 
complainant that were in the control of a third party, this would not be a provision 
that would be used in this context. 
 
There are a number of ways that are available to a witness to avoid having to 
comply with a subpoena.  A number of these are contained in the CPA, and will 
be discussed separately and analysed for effectiveness in the context of 
disclosure of personal records of sexual assault victims. 
 
The first ground for not complying with a subpoena is privilege.  Privilege exists 
when a person is not obliged to testify in court or produce documentation, even 
though the information she or he may have is relevant249.  The witness must 
enter the witness box and then raise the privilege as the reason for not 
answering the questions or disclosing documents250.  Because the effect of 
privilege is to deprive the court of relevant evidence, the courts are slow to 
extend the currently legally recognised privileges.  This legal recognition of 
privilege of communications between two parties invariably involves two 
competing interests: one, society’s interest in presenting and promoting certain 
relationships; and two, the interest in the administration of justice in placing all 
relevant information before the court251. 
 
Unlike some other countries that have recognised privileges that have extended 
beyond the traditional privileges, such as sexual assault victim/counsellor 
privilege in Australia and the US, South Africa has a very limited range of legally 
recognised privileges.  Many professions, such as doctors and psychologists 
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have ethical duties to keep confidential any communications between them and 
their patients/clients, but this ethical duty is not recognised in law, and they may 
be subpoenaed and obligated to testify on the content of the communication.  
The only professional privilege recognised in South African law is the legal 
professional privilege.  It is a common law rule that has been legislated and is 
contained in section 201 of the CPA.  Communications between a client and her 
or his lawyer may not be disclosed without the client’s consent252.  The rationale 
for this privilege is that it is a ‘doctrine based upon the view that confidentiality is 
necessary for the proper functioning of the legal system…’253 and it encourages 
people to consult with lawyers and to tell them all the facts of the case, not only 
those that favour them, in order to ensure that the lawyer is able to assist them in 
the best possible way.  Lawyer-client relations must be assured of that 
confidence for the legal system to be operative254.  The Appellate division in 
Safatsa recognised, for the first time, that legal privilege is a fundamental right 
derived from the requirements of procedural justice and not merely an evidentiary 
rule255.  It is not within the scope of this paper to criticise the rationale behind 
legal professional privilege, suffice to say that it may be upon this very rationale 
that it can be argued that a privilege of a similar nature should extend to 
communications between victims of sexual assault and counsellors.  It is 
important to note that the legal professional privilege is recognised as a 
fundamental legal right, and not conditional upon the balancing of rights between 
the holder thereof and any other party.  The privilege vests with the client and not 
the legal professional, meaning that only the client may waive the privilege256. 
 
The South African courts have rejected the extension of the legal professional 
privilege to other professions on the basis that no considerations of public policy 
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would entitle that extension257.  Some writers have argued for the extension of 
the privilege to other groups such as the clergy258 and journalists259.  In arguing 
for this extension, consideration must be given to another section in the CPA, 
section 189.  This section entitles the court to sentence a witness to 
imprisonment who does not comply with a subpoena to produce documentation 
or testify, unless the witness has a just excuse for so refusing.  A just excuse 
arises from the law of privilege, compellability of witnesses or the admissibility of 
evidence, and has been held to apply to situations beyond a lawful excuse260.  In 
Attorney-General, Transvaal v Kader261 it was held that a just excuse in terms of 
the CPA was not limited to a lawful excuse, but could also be invoked if it were 
humanly intolerable for the witness to testify262.  As Skeen points out, this 
recognition is not recognising a privilege properly so called, but the finding of a 
just excuse does afford the witness the same rights as those holding a legal 
professional privilege, and may therefore withhold evidence which may have 
otherwise been admissible263.  It could be argued that it is ‘humanly intolerable’ 
for a counsellor to testify about her communications with a sexual assault victims 
and on those grounds satisfy the requirements of section 189.  It is submitted 
however, that the courts will probably be reluctant to agree with this argument, as 
it was envisaged that this interpretation of ‘just excuse’ would involve situations 
where there was life at risk, or the questioning of a witness would result in 
serious, irreversible psychiatric damage.  While Cornelissen264 held that 
journalists possess no legal privileges to refuse to give evidence as to the 
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sources of their information, it was recognised that the refusal may, depending 
on the circumstances, amount to a just excuse. 
 
In a more recent case, the Constitutional Court considered the constitutionality of 
section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  While the constitutionality arguments 
of Nel v Le Roux NO and others265 do not concern the issues under discussion in 
this paper, a number of observations by the court are of assistance to this writer’s 
argument in favour of protection for third party records on the grounds of just 
excuse.  The court held that the provisions of section 205 incorporated section 
189 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the considerations of section 205 thus 
applied to section 189266.  Referring to one of its previous decisions, Bernstein 
and Others v Bester NO and Others267, the court considered the meaning of and 
implications of section 418 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (as amended).  This 
section requires a person to answer questions, failing which they shall be guilty 
of an offence.  This consequence may be avoided should they have ‘sufficient 
cause’268 not to answer.  The court held that ‘an examinee is not compelled to 
answer a question which would result in the unjustified infringement of any 
examinee’s Chapter 3 rights’269270.  The court went further to say that ‘…if the 
answer to any question put at such an examination would infringe or threaten to 
infringe any of the examinee’s Chapter 3 rights, this would constitute “sufficient 
cause”…unless such a right of the examinee has been limited in a way which 
passes section 33(1) scrutiny’271.  Drawing on this finding, the court in Nel found 
that there was ‘no material difference between the expression “a just excuse” in 
section 189(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act and “sufficient cause” in section 
418(5)(iii)(aa) of the Companies Act’272.  The impact of this finding is that if an 
answer to any question put to a witness would infringe or threaten to infringe any 
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of the witness’s Chapter 3 rights (now Chapter 2 rights273), this would constitute a 
‘just excuse’ for refusing to answer the question.  The witness may however be 
compelled to answer the question (or produce documentation) if the infringement 
could be justified in terms of section 33(1) of the Constitution.  The court 
unfortunately did not expand on the meaning of ‘just excuse’, but did direct that 
other courts that would be in a position to determine the meaning must bear in 
mind the duty imposed upon them by section 35(3) of the Constitution to have 
‘due regard to the spirit, purport and objects” of Chapter 3274.  It is submitted that 
this argument may be applied to the disclosure of personal records scenario, with 
the complainant and/or counsellor refusing to answer or produce documents 
relating to information in their possession.  There is however concern that the 
courts may hold that the rights of the complainant in terms of Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution, those of equality and privacy (discussed below), will be justifiably 
limited in terms of section 36 to accommodate the rights of the accused to a fair 
trial. 
 
In Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others275 the Constitutional Court held 
that the common law of privilege had not been limited by statute and that is was 
the function of all courts to have ‘due regard to the spirit, purposes and objects of 
the Chapter 3 [as it then was in the Interim Constitution] in the development of 
the common law of privilege’276.  This makes way for the possibility of an 
extension to the privilege for sexual assault victims and communications made in 
confidence to third parties. 
 
The last remaining possible CPA option for a witness to resist a subpoena would 
be in terms of section 202.  This section provides no witness may be compelled 
or permitted to give evidence (or disclose documentation) if such evidence were 
contrary to public policy or would not be in the public interest.  This section has 
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been deemed to be concerned with two categories of evidence that is protected 
against disclosure: one, matters of public or state interest; and two, information 
given for the detection of crime277.  A prima facie reading of this section indicated 
to this writer that this may indeed be a section that could possibly used by a 
witness to resist a subpoena to testify or disclose documents concerning the 
personal communications of a sexual assault victim.  Historically, public interest 
was called ‘state privilege’ referring to ‘…highest affairs of state, such as national 
security, state secrets in times of war and matters of great diplomatic 
importance’278, and it was thus in these occasions that ‘most claims to immunity 
were made were made on behalf of central government by ministers of the 
Crown’279.  The privilege no longer seems to be restricted to the state280, and 
may therefore possibly be used in the personal records context. 
 
The courts have reiterated that the public interest in receiving relevant testimony 
has to be weighed against the disadvantages that the witness was likely to suffer 
if she were to testify281.  In the striking of this balance the public interest should 
be afforded much more weight than the individual.  While the principle is agreed 
with, this writer questions the very concept of ‘public interest’.  What or whose 
public interest is being protected by these rules?  It may be argued that is in the 
public interest that the communications of sexual assault victims be protected, 
whether under the protection of privilege or just excuse.  This would be on the 
grounds of the public interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual offences for 
the good administration of justice.  As has been discussed, disclosure of 
personal records leads to a reduction in victims reporting offences, bringing the 
administration of justice into disrepute.   
 
A second challenge to this principle is that the balancing should not necessarily 
be seen to be between the public interest and the individual witness in the 
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personal records context.  The individual witness in this context represents a 
large part of the very population that informs ‘public interest’, that is sexual 
assault victims.  Therefore that balancing act is between the ‘public interest’ that 
is historically informed by a male, patriarchal, and conventional view of the legal 
system and what is considered, in the best interests of justice, to be evidence 
that is worthy of protection, and the ‘public interest’ that is informed by the 
experiences of millions of sexual assault victims, those who support them, those 
who are directly and indirectly affected by the sexual assault, and feminists who 
believe that the very construct of law is a reflection of the dominance of men in 
society.  This male construct protects the interests that men hold to be important, 
and not the interests that may undermine their power and hold them responsible 
for the unacceptable levels of violence against women and children the world 
over. 
 
As matters of this nature have not come before the South African courts as yet, it 
is submitted that another basis on which to resist having to disclose personal 
communications of a sexual assault victim would be to protect the constitutional 
rights of the victim.  Two constitutional rights of the victim that will be discussed 




It is acknowledged at the outset of this section that both the rights of equality 
(with regard to gender) and privacy in the South African Bill of Rights are 
derogable rights, and can thus be limited in terms of section 36, if the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom.  Once again, this paper does not allow for an 
extensive discussion on these rights and how they have been interpreted by the 







The issue of sexual violence is an equality issue as it overwhelmingly perpetrated 
against women and girl children.  In South Africa, more than 50 000 reports of 
rape were made to the police in 2003, with half of those being perpetrated 
against children282.  An added equality dimension is that in other jurisdictions, 
such as Canada where disclosure applications have been the order of the day for 
some twenty years, personal records are sought almost exclusively in sexual 
assault cases283.  In entering into an equality rights analysis, two issues must be 
addressed.  First, what is the inequality and how is it created and maintained?  
What are the social constructs relied upon by law and its implementers to ‘justify’ 
the inequality?  Secondly, what is the impact of this law and its implementation, 
especially the disproportional impacts284?  The reliance on evidence based on 
discriminatory beliefs, and the subsequent prejudicial effects on fact finding 
violates the equality rights of the victim285.  The reliance on beliefs such as 
women are likely to lie about sexual assault due to vindictiveness, and to protect 
their sexual reputations justifies the use of personal records, is fundamentally 
unfair to women as there is no proof the world over that women have a greater 
propensity to lie about sexual assault than any other victim of any crime.  The 
high levels of withdrawal of sexual assault cases cannot be attributed to false 
charges, but rather to victims being intimidated by perpetrators, victims losing 
faith in the system largely due to time delays in finalising cases, alternative 
resolution of cases through community structures or families, or lack of evidence. 
 
The disproportionate impact of the practice of disclosing records of sexual 
assault victims is that this practice has (and probably will in South Africa) 
undermined supportive counselling relationships in other jurisdictions286.  Victims 
cease to use these services, and counsellors have been forced to use other 
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means to protect these communications such as destroying records, which have 
in turn negatively impacted on these services287.  As discussed above, access to 
records also disproportionately impacts on women and children who are heavily 
documented.  Lastly, the rate of reporting of sexual assault cases will be 





The right to privacy enshrined in the South African Constitution provides for the 
bearers of the right not to have their person or home or property searched, their 
possessions seized or the privacy of their communications infringed288.  In the 
Canadian case of O’Connor the accused’s defence attorney is on records saying 
that if sexual assault victims did not have anything to hide they would not object 
to releasing their personal records289.  This is a commonly held belief, revealing a 
misunderstanding of the right to privacy, and a disregard of the secondary 
victimisation experienced by sexual assault victims at the hands of the criminal 
justice system.  The statement also reveals the belief that women lie about 
sexual assault and fabricate charges against innocent men.  If the right to privacy 
were upheld in the case of personal records of sexual assault victims, this would 
presume against ordering disclosure.  Privacy must be protected because of the 
intimate nature of communications between counsellor and victim, not because 
the ‘truth’ of ‘what really happened’ is being kept secret by both victim and 
counsellor.  The presumed290 explanation behind this theory is that there is a 
conspiracy against men by women who cry rape (for the reasons discussed 
above) and either hoodwink the likes of counsellors into believing them or tell the 
counsellor the ‘truth’ – that the sexual assault did not occur, and together they 
decide for the victim to pursue the charges anyway for some unarticulated benefit 
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or gain.  Alternatively, it is the counsellors themselves who influence women that 
they have been sexual assaulted, and encourage them to lay charges against 
innocent men. 
 
The Constitutional Court has considered the right to privacy in a number of 
cases.  In Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others291 the court considered 
the right in the context of a section 417 enquiry of the South African Companies 
Act 61 of 1973 (as amended).  Briefly, the applicants were resisting the 
subpoena and the compulsion to answer particular questions in terms of this 
section.  As no courts in South Africa have ruled on the issue of disclosure of 
personal records, it is intention of this section of the paper to draw on some 
comments from this Constitutional case on the rights to privacy and how they 
relate to resisting a subpoena to testify.  The court discussed the concept of 
privacy in detail, saying that it an amorphous and elusive one.  It acknowledged 
the scope of privacy being closely linked to the concept of dignity and that it is 
not based on a notion of the unencumbered self, but on the notion of what is 
necessary to have one’s own autonomous identity292.  The court accepted that 
no right is absolute, and in the context of privacy, only the inner sanctum of the 
person, such as his/her inner family life, sexual preference and home 
environment is shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the community293.  A 
breach of privacy occurs either when there is an unlawful intrusion upon the 
personal privacy of another or by way of unlawful disclosure of private facts of a 
person.  The unlawfulness is judged in the light of the contemporary boni mores 
and the general sense of justice of the community as perceived by the court294. 
 
It is submitted that the courts have the opportunity to hold in the case of 
disclosure of personal records that the breach of privacy that occurs when 
communications between a sexual assault victim and counsellor are revealed to 
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the defence constitutes an unlawful infringement as it is against the boni mores 
of the South African community.  It is so because if the real voices of the 
community were heard on this matter, and opinions of the courts were informed 
by these voices, the rights of sexual assault victims would be more adequately 
protected, and not disrespected by relying on antiquated notions and beliefs 
about women, children and sexual assault. 
 
If it were held by the South African courts that the right to privacy of victims of 
sexual assault in relation to their private communications with their counsellors 
was justifiably limited in terms of section 36, it is submitted that the courts 
themselves would have fallen prey to the very prejudices and stereotypes that 
the Constitution attempts to protect against.  To justify access to these records 
on the basis of providing the accused a fair trial, or that they may contain 
exculpatory evidence, or that they may contain relevant evidence to the fact 
finding process, is to place our courts and the administration of justice firmly in 
the paradigm that discriminates against women and sexual assault victims simply 
because they are women and sexual assault victims, and they lie. 
 
S v Alex Henry and Pillay and another v The Regional Court Magistrate, 
Pietermaritzburg and Others 295
 
There have been no reported South African cases on the issue of disclosure of 
personal records of sexual assault victims.  Anecdotally, the practice in South 
African courts is uncontested compliance by third parties of subpoenas issued to 
produce either documentary evidence or oral evidence about the complainant.  In 
addition, the complainant is also compliant should she be asked by the defence 
to produce personal documents, such as diaries.  This compliance is based on 
instructions from the prosecution, who have not, to date, questioned the practice 
of the defence requesting documentation or questioned the court in allowing this 
information into evidence.  It must however be said that the practice of requesting 




this information is relatively rare and to a large extent is restricted to personal 
documents in the possession of the complainant, such as diaries296.  Generally 
there seems to be a combination of lack of awareness on the part of the 
prosecution of the possible infringements on the rights of the complainant by 
allowing this information into evidence and an accepted belief that information of 
this nature is per se relevant. 
 
The case of Henry has highlighted this issue publicly for the first time and has 
been covered in the media, which has resulted in a raised awareness. Briefly, the 
facts of the case are as follows: the complainant, a woman in her late twenties, 
began a counselling relationship with a psychologist as she was depressed, and 
was having trouble in her marriage.  At some stage in the counselling, the 
complainant revealed to the psychologist that she had been raped by the 
accused when she was ten years old.  The complainant then laid charges of rape 
and indecent assault against the accused.  As part of the investigation the 
psychologist was asked to prepare an expert report on the effects of the sexual 
assault on the complainant, which she duly did, which was discovered to the 
defence.  On the basis of the report the defence asked for further and better 
particulars in relation to the report, requesting all the files and documents 
pertaining to the sessions of psychotherapy, copies of all the tests the pertaining 
to psychological assessment and copies of all consultation notes from the 
sessions.  The argument of the accused was based on the assertion of his right 
to a fair trial in that these notes were needed in order for him to prepare his 
cross-examination of the complainant and the expert witness (the psychologist).  
At this stage of the proceedings, counsel represented the complainant and 
psychologist.  The argument of the complainant and psychologist in resisting 
production of the information was that the information was strictly confidential 
and was not relevant to the charges against the accused.  They also alleged that 
the communication was privileged. The prosecution was silent on the issue. 
                                                





The judgement of the magistrate, with respect, is flawed in a number of ways.  
The court ruled that as a result of the complainant’s decision to ‘go public with 
the matter’297 by reporting the matter to the police she ‘herself had decided to let 
go of the confidential and privileged relationship between herself and the 
[psychologist]’298.  The court reasoned the complainant knew that the matter 
would be heard in open court and this amounted to a waiver of her rights to 
confidentiality with the psychologist.  It is submitted that this reasoning is nothing 
short of absurd, has no foundation in law, and should be rejected by the High 
Court on appeal.  However, it is submitted that court was correct on one point 
that it raised: the report prepared by the psychologist was recognised as that of 
an expert, and for that reason, the information that formed the basis of the report 
and led to the conclusions reached in the report must be made available to the 
defence in order for him to adequately prepare his defence.  This information was 
what the defence had requested and must therefore be handed to the defence. 
 
The complainant and the psychologist have appealed the decision of the 
magistrate, and the matter is to be heard in the KwaZulu High Court in October 
2005.  It is submitted that, based on the papers before the court, submitted by 
the applicants, the issues have been conflated and misconstrued.  The 
applicants have based their refusal to produce the documentation on arguments 
of privacy and dignity of the complainant in terms of the Bill of Rights and the 
privilege of the confidential relationship between the complainant and her 
psychologist.  Issues of public policy of the rights of sexual assault victims have 
been raised and arguments put forward of the deleterious effects on sexual 
assault victims if this type of information is revealed to the defence, not only in 
this case, but in cases to follow. 
 
                                                




While this writer is in full support of these arguments of the complainant and 
psychologist in relation to the issues of disclosure of personal information to the 
defence, and is of the opinion that personal information should never be 
disclosed on the basis that it is irrelevant to the fact finding process, this case 
differs fundamentally in one respect - the state is relying on an expert witness 
report (and potential testimony) as part of its case against the accused.  That 
expert is the psychologist of the complainant in this case.  On this basis alone, 
the accused is entitled to information that has informed that expert report and 
opinion.  The information from the psychologist sessions is not admissible on the 
basis of relevance in that it may reveal exculpatory evidence of the accused, but 
rather because it forms the basis of the expert report. 
 
Both the applicants and the media have misconstrued the issues in this case.  It 
is submitted that the High Court should find in favour of the accused in this case, 
and rightly so.  The unfortunate consequences are that the manner in which this 
will be reported and interpreted by the media and the public is that this amounts 
to the defence being able to access all personal information about sexual assault 
victims from their counsellors as a matter of course.  It is submitted that to 
prevent this from happening, the prosecution must withdraw the expert report.  If 
the defence persists in claiming access the information from the counselling 
sessions, it will have to motivate with reasons why access is necessary.  If the 
reasons mirror those in other jurisdictions, such as revealing of information 
showing that complainant has motive to lie, or that the psychologist influenced 
the memories of the complainant, then the complainant, psychologist and the 
prosecution have excellent grounds to oppose the application, making use of the 









It is evident that there are four options available for legislative intervention to 
regulate the disclosure of victim communications to counsellors in sexual assault 
trials.  Option one is an absolute prohibition, making all counselling records 
inadmissible on the premise that counselling records are never relevant to the 
facts in issue or the credibility of the complainant.  Option two provides for a legal 
privilege and is based on the premise that it is in the public interest to protect 
confidentiality, and that it outweighs the public interest in an accused being able 
to access all relevant evidence.  This privilege would either be absolute or, option 
three, would be subject to an exception if the accused could show that the 
communications contained evidence necessary to establishing the innocence of 
the accused.  This option would be subject to procedural requirements and 
requirements of motivation and substantiation by the accused to avoid ‘fishing 
expeditions’.  Option four would provide that the evidence is inadmissible unless 
the accused can show relevance, again with the concomitant procedural and 
evidential requirements on the accused. 
 
It is submitted that although no other jurisdiction has absolutely prohibited the 
use of victim-counsellor records in sexual assault trials, this is the option that is 
recommended for South Africa.  Where courts have had the jurisdiction to rule on 
relevancy of evidence as it relates to sexual assault victims, the research shows 
that relevance is justified too often under the guise of affording the accused the 
right to a fair trial. 
 
If however the South African legislature chooses to adopt a similar approach to 
that of the Canadians, the Americans or the Australians, it is submitted that 
important issues of locus standi and legal representation for complainants and 





It is submitted that option one is the option containing the most legal integrity.  To 
base the exclusion of evidence on a legal privilege is to concede that the 
evidence may be relevant, but is protected by public interest.  The very premise 
of the objection by feminists supporting the non-disclosure of records is that they 
are irrelevant to the truth finding process.  To entertain the possibility that this 
evidence may be relevant to any issue at trial, in particular the innocence of the 
accused, is to buy wholesale into the myths about women and sexual assault.  
To do so not only fails women, but also the administration of justice.  However, of 
practical concern is the argument that option one may still require the court to 
have sight of the evidence to establish that it constitutes communications 
between the complainant and a third party.  This would undermine the purpose of 
the protection.  While option one is indeed preferable in principle, practicality may 
dictate that the most effective manner in which to protect complainants of sexual 
violence is to create and recognise a privilege similar to that of the lawyer client 
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